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1u.s. Foraign Economic Poliey:
The Dynamics oi the Debate
Robert A. Pastor
l. Introduction
Despite the considerable impact that U.s. foreign economic
policy exerts on Latin America, there have been few systematic
efferts by Latin Americans to understand either the policy or
the process by which it is made. Te many Latin American scholars
and policy-makers, U.s. foreign economic policy is made by
multinational corporations with the purpose of exploiting Latin
America and imposing dependency. The possibility of influencing
the policy from the outside ls thought so unlikely that it is
not even considerad. 1
The truth iB different: most U.S. policies are the result
o f a debate where interes'ts and ideas compete. The essence oi
the debate on U.s. foreign economic policy is whether the U.S.
will protect the interests of particular industries and unions,
or whether it will defend the general interest of the U.S. in a
relatively free and competitiva global economic system. 2 While
1 For one example, sae Aldo Ferrer, liLa America Latina y
los Paises Capitalistas Desarrollados: Una Perspectiva del
Modelo Centro-Periferia," y Osvaldo Sunkel, "La Naturaleza de la
Dependencia Latinoamericana," en Rene Villareal, comp., EconQmia
Internacional (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1979).
2 For two good studies of U.S. foreign economic policy and
the procesa by which it is mada, see l. M. Destler,
F o.r el i gn Economic Po 1 i qy (Wash ington, D. c.: Brookings
Institution, 1980); and Stephen D. Cohen, The Making of united
this debate betweendomestic and international interests has not
changed much, the process by which the lssues are debated has
changed quite definitively. The debate was alosed for of
ú. S. history, but a series of reforms in the mid-19 7Os in
Congress openad crucial aspects of the debate to the public and
te other interested parties, including foreign governments and
groups. 3
In these debates, U.S. policy-makers try to take into
account the concerns of other governments, whether they
succeed depends in part on whether other governments effectively
communicate their concerns. The process as well as the policy
are poorly served if foreign do not use this
opportunity. rf one believes that U.S. prosperity is
increasingly tied to the prosperity of its trading partners, then
one would conclude that U.S. policy should reflect their CQncerns
as well as domestic interests.
The purpose of this monograph is to define and explain U.s.
foreign economie policy in a manner that will help one to see the
causes of the policy and the options and opportunities tor
changing it.
--In part II, we shall define U.S. foreign economic
states International Ecpnomic Policy: PrincipIes, Problems, and
proposals for Refor,m (N.Y.: Praeger, 1977).
3 For a description of these refonns and their implications
for U. S. foreign economia policy, see Leroy Rieselbach,
Congressional Reform in the Seventies (Morristown, N.J.: The
Learning Press, 1977) i and Robert Pastor, COllgress anO; the
Politice of D.S. Foreign Economic Policy (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1980), pp. 14-25.
3policy.
--In part 111, we shall select from the universe of
foreign economic policies those which are important to Latin
America and subject to influence. The three issues are trade,
foreign investment, and aid. Then, we shall def ina these
policias and explain how U.S. policy on each of these issues has
evolved ovar time.
--In part IV, we shall re-examine the three policies
and seek to determine whether these policies can be considered
coherent and consistent.
--In part V, we shall analyze the trends and current
debates with regard to each of the three issues. What are the
main issues on the contemporary foreign economic policy agenda?
--And finally in part VI, we will assess the policy
implications of the previous analysis. How should Latin America
try to monitor U.S. foreign economic policies? How could Latin
America most effectively communicate its concerns in the united
states during these policy debates?
11. Definitions
It is impossible to influence 2 government's policy without
defining the policy or understanding how that government
functions. In a govarnment as complex and diffuse as that of the
united states, there is no simple definition of policy nor any
single formula for explaining how policy is made. The bigger
problem is the opposite: there are many policies and even more
formulas. The problem is to 6ift through the mass of information
4on U.S. foreign economic policy in a manner that distinguishes
between the relevant and the unimportant. first task then i8
to craft a framework, a taxonomy, that will offer valid and
useful distinctions between policies.
There are few impoFtant terms that are used so loosely and
defined so infrequently as "U.S. foreign economic policy." This
is partly because the terro is used to apply to such different
phenomenae tha t i t is hard to see what kind of um1;)rella could
cover them all. The following list of foreign economic policies
illustrates the dilemma: the Caribbean Ba$tn Initiative,
countervailing duties on Mexican tomatoes, U.S. interest rates,
subsidies on agricultural products, a Congressional resolution on
anti-trust activities, environmental rules, the debt problem, and
the value of the dollar.
What these policias and issues have in common are that they
relate to economic issues that affect both the domestic economy
and the way the U.S, relates to the world. A more precise
definition of U.S. foreign economic is that it encompasses
tlle totality of U.S. government actions that affect the
international economy ei ther direct¿y or by adjusting--the ..
the U.S. economy relates to it. 4
As U.S. trade and foreign investment increased absolutely
and as a percentage of the gross domestic product, the number of
4 Por a fuller elaboration of this and subsequent
definitions of U. S. foreign economic policies, see Robert
Pastor, Congress and the Poli tícs of U. S. Foreign Economic
Eolicy (Berkeley: university of California Press, 1980).
5policias that ware once considered wholey domestic are reduced.
Today, any governmentpolicy that affectsthe price or the market
tor a product, commodity (including money), or a service,
conferring either an advantage on a nation's exports or
investments or a disadvantage on its imports, is a foreign
economia policy'!"
All U.S. foreign economic policies are not egual nor are
all made in similar ways. The politics of different policies
also differ. Yet how does one distinguish between such diverse
U.S. policies as North-South relations, economic sanctions
against the U.S.S.R., sugar quotas, or local contento To
understand the various debates on u.s. foreign economic policies
and the determinants of each policy, one must refine the
definition and understand not only how the policies are similar,
but how they differ. We should begin by refining our use of
different terms. A taxonomy below defines U.S. foreign economic
policy in terms of issues, purposes, geographical destination,
decision mode, or decision-making arena.
r r . l. By Issue: The key issues of U. S. foreign
economic policy include trade, investment (inward ano outward),
aid, money, agriculture, industry support or adjustment, energy,
and new issues of interdependence like oceans, transportation,
and the environment.
II.2 By Purpose: Foreign economic policy has three
distinct purposes, which require different terms. "Economic
diplomacy" is the use of economic instruments-- credit, aid, and
6trade preferences-- for political (or security) The
use of economic sanctions-- reducing aid or trade-- is economic
diplomacy. "Rule-making" is the use of politics to set rules for
economic transactions between a state and/or ita citizens and
those of another state; and it is also the totality pf
governmental actions whose purpose is to affect the international
economy. The passage of maj or trade laws by Congress are
of "rule-making." Finally, " intermestic" policies
refar to those that serve both domestic and international
interests. Sugar quotas or food aid (PL-480) are examples of
intermestic policy; they are designed to help U.S. farmers while
assisting friendly governments.
II.3 By Dest!nation: There are also three different
geographical ways to define and organize U.S. foreign economic
policies: North-North, North-South, and East-West. At the ccre
of U.s. foreign economic policies are those dlrected to those
advanced industrialized nations of Japan and Europe (North-
North) with which the united States does most of its interna-
tional bus iness. North-North policies or rules include mO$t-
favered-nation treatment in national treatment of
investment; and the search fer harmonization of domestic
e.g. on inflation. North-South policias are directed
more toward assisting the development of the poorer countries by
offering them special preferences froro the North-North rulas.
In East-Wast economia policíes, the U.S. gives much greater
weight toward bending the rules-- in one direction or the other--
7in order to defend or pursue U. S. security interests vis-a-vis
the Communist countries.
Ir.4 By Decision Mode: There are many kinds of
policies, including a Presidential speech on investment disputes,
a Congressional resolution on trade preferences, a decision by
the International Trade commission, or a treaty. All policias,
of course, are not egual, although they are sometimes incorrectly
interpreted as if they were. For example, a congressional
resolution does not have the force of a law, although it is
important as a sign of intento Decisions by the International
Trade Commission or the President are more important as policies
than speeches by Administration officials.
The policy-making process, of course, varies with the
policy, and a crucial first distinction is between genuine
policies and signals, which Congressmen send to their
constituents. For example, many analysts interpreted the
introduction of the Burke-Hartke bill in 1971 as a sign the U.S.
was turning toward protectionism, but the bill was introduced
more as a warning than as a policYi the warning was aimed at the
Europeans and Japanese to open their markets lest they prompt the
U.S. to reciprocate by closing its markets. The bill also had a
second purpose, to signal to American constituents that their
Congressmen were looking after their interests. The signals were
reasonably effective -- the Europeans and Japanese negotiated in
good faith while American industries waited patiently for
results. As a result, the United states passed the Trade ReforID
8of 1974, which was one of the most significant laws lowering
trade barriers in u.s. history.
A second important distinction is between micrq- and
macro-policias. A micro-policy i8 each specific statement
or action while a macro-policy is a general statement or an
inference that one can draw about the general policy
examining a11 the specific micro-policies of a particular issue.
For example, in the trade area, a micro-policy would be a
decision on shoes by the International Trade Commission, the
passage of a trade bill, or a free-trade agreement with Israel,
whereas a macro-policy wou1d be a summary statement-- perhaps by
the President-- of all of U.S. trade policy. Such a statement or
inference should theoretically be broad enough to include
micro-policies that might seem contradictory.
I1.5 By Principal Decision-Making Arena: U.S.
foreign economic policy is made in many forums, or
arenas. The arenas include the Executive Branch, Congress, the
Judicial Branch, prívate interest groups, and states and local
governments. The arena in Which a decision is made will help to
explain how a policy is made and who makes it.
***
The difficulty in understanding U.S. foreign economic
policy is partly due to the failure to recognize or distinguish
between thes e f i ve parameters. Let 's take a few examples to
illustrate this point.
In U. S. politics, different coalitiol1S of leaqers and
9interest groups congrega te around different issues. The
agriculture committees in both Houses of Congress are principally
responsible for agriculture issues; the Senate Finance and the
Rouse Ways and Means Committees are mainly charged with trade and
tax issues; the Foreign Affairs and the Appropriations Committees
have principal responsibility for foreign aid; and so on. A
similar division of responsibility occurs in the Executive
Branch, and among the outside interest groups that monitor each
issue. To monitor, let alone to influence a policy, one needs
to know the issue -- whether trade, agriculture, investment,
etc.-- and the nature of the decision -- whether a law, an
administrative action, or just a signal.
The politics of foreign aid often reflect the llpurpose ll
that decision-makers impute to ......ll.., and this can be seen in the
debate. For example, if the purpose of aid to El Salvador is
11 economic di plomacy," to defend the regime against a Communist
insurrection¡ then the Congressmen will generally debate the
issue on those political and security grounds. Some will
ask whether aid is the best defense or whether there is a more
appropriate way to help the government. If the aid is an
lIintermestic" issue, such as the PL-480 food aid¡ then the
agriculture committees will probably dominate¡ and the key
issues will relate more to the health of the American farmer
than the tood needs of the developing countries.
The d e e i s o n ro o d e a ndar e n a a re J<: e y va r i a b 1 e s f o r"
understanding the relativa importancs of a policy and the
10
politice andprocess by which it is made. One needs first to
distinguish between legislative and actions, and
then between signals (resolutions, bilIs, petitions, speeches)
and policy commitments (laws, administrative decisions,
treaties) . Congressional bilIs, resolutions, speaches, or
hearings are often intended more as signals to the Executive
Branch, foreign governments, or local constituents than as
policYi they are not commitments. In 1969, Congress defined a
"national commitment" as an act that involved "affirmative action
taken by the executive and legislative branches." It is easier
to alter a policy while it is just a signal than after it
becomes a commitment.
These five parameters are therefore useful as a
for understanding how specific policies are mada.
IIr. U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: Three Cases
Two criteria wil1 be used in selecting those U.S. foreign
economic policies of special relevance to Latin America: first,
the importance of the policy on Latin America's development¡ and
second, the possibility of influancing the formulation of such a
pelicy. The rise in U.S. interest ratas in 1980 probably had a
more decisive effect on Latin American economi$s than any other
recent u.s. foreign economic policy, yet neither U.S. interest
rate policy nor U.S. monetary policy will be considered because
these policies are highly resistant to outside influence, and
indead, are even difficult for en Administration or Congress to
influence. A better use of resources i5 to concentrate on those
11
policies that can be changed.
The obvious candidates are the three issues of trade,
investment, and aid policies. From the perspective of many in
Latin America, U.S. foreign investment policy has been and
continues to be viewed as central; indeed, there are few Latin
American studies on U.S. foreign economic policy that consider
anything but multinational corporations. Foreign aid
subsequently came to be perceived by many Latin Americans as an
instrument for coercing Latin America to welcome U.S.
multinational corporations and treat them well. 5 Finally, as
LatinAmerica emerges from its long experiment with import-
substitution policies and begins to adapt its development
strategy to become more export-oriented, U.S. trade policies will
inevitably increase in importance.
In short, these three issues appear the most importaht
u.s. foreign economic policies for Latin America. In this part,
we shall first define each policy, and then describe how these
policies have been made and how they have evolved over time. In
the next section, we examine whether the policies are coherent
and consistent.
5 See, for example, Carlos S. Malpica, El Mito de la Ayuda
Exterior (Lima: Francisco Mondoa Editores, 1969); and Heraldo
Muna z, "Interdependenc ia des igual: Las Relaciones Economicas
Entre Estados Unidos y America Latina," Cuadernos Semestrales,
No. 8, Mexico, e.I.o.E., 2 Semestre 1980.
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¡AI.l U.S. Trade Policy
III.l.! Definition. Trade policy can be as
the sum total of actions bY-the state that aftect the amounts,
composition, and direction oi its imports and exports oí goods
ª-11Sl services. From 1789 until the completion of the Kenned:y
Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1967, the most
important trade issue for American legislators, administrators,
and negotiators was the tariff: whether and how to raise,
lower, or eliminate tariffs on a particular product or group of
products. However, as tariffs were lowered to an
level and world trade grew and became a significant engine of
economia growth, trade policy became intertwined with virtually
all economic pOlicies.
Trade policy can be dafined more precisely in terms of an
import and an export policy:
Impor...:L...Po 1 lcy: ls the sum of the follor,'ling four
micro-policies: (1) promotion of imports (trade laws), which
serve the interest of all U. S. consumers; (2) restriction of
imports (tariffs, Non-Tariff Barriers), which serve the interest
of some industries and unio:¡1s; ;3) regulations (on health¡
safety, or trademarks) ¡ which affect imports, altheugh their
principal purpose is to U.S. citizens er inventionsi and
(4) poI icies tha t crea te I main té\. in I 01' adapt elements er the
entire internatienal econemic system.
EXJ20rt poI i._Q..Yl. is the sum of two micro-policíes:
(.1.) promotian of exports (trac':,ol negot:iations: Ex-1m Bank¡
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treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Navigation¡ PL-480¡ and
(2) restriction and regulation of exports, either for strategic
purposes (strategic stockpiling, export control act; arms
sales; nuclear non-proliferation) or for economic reasons (the
soyabean embargo) .
II1.1.2 The Policy-Making Process.
u.s. trade policy is made in three arenas: in Congress, by
1aw ¡ in the Execu'tive Branch, by administrative decision,
executive order, or agreement¡ and internationally, by GATT
decision or negotiated (or "voluntaryll) agreement. Trade laws
and agreements are the most important items of trade policy;
congressional resolutions¡ bilIs, and speeches are more useful in
explaining the process and the politics than the policy.
Nonetheless, the careful observer should watch the signals and
judge whether they have elicited the correct response from the
Executive Branch and the foreign government¡ if they fail, then
the signals could become policy. 6
II...:[. l. 3 Evolution of Trade Policy.
with the exception of two brief periods of relatively low
tariffs-- 1846-60 and 1913-22-- U.S. trade po1iey until 1934 was
largely proteetionist, dominated bya coalition of Northern
industrialists and farmers. The tariff was the principal
souree of revenue for the U.S. government until the Constitution
-------------
6 For an elaboration of this process, see Robart Pastor,
"The Cry end 8igh SyndrOl'né: Congrat;s anc1 Tradlal Policy,1I in Allan
Schick (ed.), Mªking Ecqnomie Pol19Y-ln. Congress (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprisé Institute, 1983).
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was amanded te permit an ineome tax in 1913 (the 16th amendment).
Most Americans, incÚiding President Herbert Hoover, cons1d,erecj
the tariff "soley a domestic question in protection of our
people." 7
By the turn of the century, trada had increased in
importance to the U. S ., and Congress began experimenting with
various different modes of permitting trade while protecting
u.s. market. Congress, for example, authorized a "f1exibl,e
tariff," and it began to de1egate authority to the President to
negotiate reciproca1 treaties.
A decisiva move toward freer trade had to await the
di.sastrous mistake of the Smoot-Haw1ey Tariff of 1930, which
raised U.S. tariffs to their highest ratas in the twentieth
century, 52.8% ad va1orem. The !inal bi11 included specific
tariff schedu1es for more than 20,000 products, and almost a11 of
them increased the rate over previous 1ave1s. Many writers of
u.s. trada policy have been so influenced by the $pectac1e of.
interest groups writing the Smoot-Hawley Tariff that they
repeatedly see its visage in every trade bill introduced in
Congress. 8 However, instead of a symbol of what was to fo11ow,
Smoot-Hawley represented the end of an era of high tariff
7 Hoover's comment is in William staff Meyers and Walter H.
Newton, 1'he lioover Ad..ministration: A Docu1nJal'tt,ed 1'Iª:r,rative y • :
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 493-95. I
8 Analysts were strongly influenced by the definitiva study
of the Smoot-Hawley tariff by E. E. Schattschneider,
and A study
Folitigs I as ShoWD :t.n theJ929::;tQ. Rev.1s1,Qn (N. Y. :
Prentioe Hall, Inc. 1935).
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policias, unquestioned Cangressional abeisance to interest
groups, and weak Presidantial leadership. 9
The real watershed in U. s. trade policy occurred in 1934
with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. since
then, the argument for protection became an argument of exception
rather than principIe. Since then, overall U.S. barriers to
international trade have consistently been lowered. U.S. trade
policy has evolved through three phases during the last fifty
years: (1) bilateral agreements to reduce tariffs (1934-45); (2)
multilateral trade agreements under the auspices of GATT to
reduce tariffs (1945-67); and (3 ) multilateral negotiations to
harmonize, reduce, or eliminate nontariff barriers
(1967-present) . Let us briefly review the politics and the
policy during each of these periods.
__ and Reciprocity, 1934-45
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 authorized the
President (and by him, his representatives) to negotiate
bilateral trade agreements to reduce tariffs by as much as 50%
of their 1934 level on a reciprocal basis.
For the first time l instead of setting tariffs on each
product, Congress delegated the responsibility to the President
to negotiate tariff reductions. SecondlYI the President did not
have te re-submit the agreement to Congress fer appreval or
ratif1.cation. However, at the ragueli1t o! Congress, tha Presidant
----_._-_.
9 Far a critique of the Schattschneider book and the
elaboration of this propos.i.tion I ses kZobert Pastor I Co..ngress ang
of U.S.
16
establishe-d. an Exeeutive Committee on Reeiprocity that wquld
listen to the concerns of adverse1y-effected interest group$ and
communicate them· to the. trade negotiators. The principIe oi
giving industries a voíee and, in special cases, some relief from
t.ariff concessions became known as the "escape clause, '1 and it
was accepted as an essential element in trade policy by both
branches of the government. Escape clause Were al so inserted in
the trade agreements. Although the President wanted pennanent
negotiating authority, Congress insisted that the Executive
Branch return periodica1ly to Congress to justify the po1icy and
seek renewals of authority. The President did just that, and
Congress extended his authority in 1937, 1940, and 1943.
Between 1934 and 1945, the state Department negotiated
twenty-eight bilateral trada agreements, and tariffs f.ell froID an
average of 59.1% in 1932 to 28.2% in 1945. Put another way, the
tariff rates on 64% of a11 dutiab1e imports were reduced by 44%.
111.1.3.2 Mu1tilateralism and Reduction L
1945-67
As the second world war came to an end, the United states
faced a choice between three options: (1) raise its trade
barriers and turn inward as it had after the first world war¡ (2)
continue with its bilateral reciprocal agreements; or (3) pursue
the role of global leader and seek to reduce world barriers to
trade.
option.
Presidents Roosevelt and then Truman chose the third
In November 1946, after Truman received a new grant of
negotiating authority from Congress, the United states invited
17
twenty-two nations te the first round of multilateral trade
negotiations in Genéva. within a year, a new agreement --
callad the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-- was
reached, reducing tariffs en more than 45,000 items that
accounted for more than one-half of world trade. At Congress's
insistence, the U. S. inserted the "escape clause" concept as
Article XIX of the GATT.
U.S. trade policy had become multilateral in theory,
but in practice, the U.S. made mostly unilateral concessions
in Geneva and at subsequent rounds of trade negotiations. The
U.S. waited until 1962 for the European and Japanese economies to
recover before demanding that they lower their trade barriers to
match U.S. tariffs.
In 1962, after vigorous lobbying by President Kennedy,
Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, which for the first
time gave the President authority to negotiate on an across-the-
board, 1 inear method rather than product-by-product. The
President had authority for five, years to negotiate tariff
reductions by 50%. As a resul t of the "Kennedy Round" that
concluded on June 30, 1967, 46 nations agreed to reduce the
average tariff for industrialized countries to a point-- about
9%-- where it ceased to become a critical barrier to trade. From
1946 to 1967, U. S. exports tripled from about $10 bil1ion to
about $31 billion, and world trade expanded from about $55
billion to about $235 billion.
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III.1.3.3 Non-Tariff Barriers, 1967- present
The lowering of tariffs and the growth of world trade and
investment transformed the agenda of trade negotiations. The
principal issue became "non-tariff barriers," which Robert
Baldwin defines as "any measure (public or private) that causes
internationally traded goods and or resourCeS davoted
to the produetion of these goods and services, to be allocated
ifl sueh a way as to reduce potential real world incorna." 10 What
this means, in effect, is that since 1967, there is hardly an
economic iesue that could not be considered legitimate object
?f world trade negotiations. Regulatory policies-- such
safety, health, or pollution standards-- regional
subsidies, and discriminatory procurement procedures became
issues of international trade because each of these conferred an
advantage tor a country's products and a disadvantage for
potential imports.
In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress gave the President
authority to lower tariffs even further. In addition, Congress
devised a novel mechanism to permit the negotiation of non-tariff
barriers. The Act also implemented a ten-year generalized system
of tariff preferences (GSP) to provide duty-free access for many
products to the U.S. market for developing countries. This
provision represented a significant departure froro the most-
favored-nation principle, but it was a recognition of the
10 Robert E. Baldwin, Non-T.ª-*,ift:. Di.stortions of .illternatJ.onal
I.rlade (Washington, D. C.: BrooJcLngs Institution, 1970), pp. :;¡··5.
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importance of increased trade as a tool for economic development,
andit was a step already taken by many of the other
industrialized countries.
The U. S. assumed the lead in the seventh "Tokyo Round 11 of
multilateral trade negotiations and joined with forty-one nations
that together accounted for 90% of world trade to complete an
agreement on April 12, 1979. The United States agreed to cut
its tariffs on industrial goods by an average of 30% -- from
8.2% to 5.7%-- over an eight year period beginning in 1980. On
import-sensitive products, such as textiles and steel, tariff
reductions would be deferred until 1982 but would amount to
almost 40%. In addition, sector arrangeroents were negotiated on
steel, civil aircraft, and agricultural trade; and five new
nontariff codes of conduct were negotiated to bring the practices
of governments more in harmony on subsidies and countervailing
duties, government procurement, products ' standards, import
licensing, and custoros valuation.
The agreements on non-tariff barriers did not prove as
effective as many had hoped. Instead of completing vTork on
these issues, the codes represented the beginning of a very
difficult process. First, the international community had
to agree that it was worth negotiating Non-Tariff Barriers
(NTB's), which most governments viewed as strictly domestico
Second, one had to define the issues with sufficient specificity
to permit meaningful negotiations. Then, and only then, did
serious negotiations baooms possible.
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Sinee the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, the U.S. has
pressed tor further negotiations on services, subsidies, high
techology goods, rules on investment, procurement, agriculture,
and better protection for intellectual property rights (patents,
copyrights, trademarks). Little progress was made. At the
time, the U.S. trade imbalance grew to awesome proporti.ons-- from
$33 billion in 1981 to $123 billion in 1984 to $145 billion in
1985. North Americans viewed the imbalance as caused by an
over-valued exchange rate and the fact that the U.S. had a more
open marke't than i ts trading partners. Pressures tor
protectionism grew.
Despite such pressures, the Congress considered and passed
two significant liberalizing trade bills. First, the Caribbean
Basin Initiative was passed in August 1983 by Congress and
permitted, for the first time, one-way free trade-- with sorne
significant exceptions-- for products from individual nations in
the Caribbean and Cent.ral America.
Secondly, Congress approved the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984, which gave the President additional authority to press for
a new round of trade negotiations and to negotiate the reduction,
and if necessary, the increase of tariffs and l":\on-tariff
barriers. Concerned that other governments were resisting a new
round of trade negotiations, Congress also delegated to the
President additional authority to negotiate sectoral arrangements
and "free trade agreements" on a bilateral basia.
The GSP was intended to ba temporary and was ciua to
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in January 1985, but Congresa extended it for another eight and
ona-half years in the Trada Act of 1984. However, the new
act gave the Presidant authority to negotiate reductions of the
trade barriers of the advanced developing countries, which were
becaming more competitive, and to report to Congress in 1988 with
a list of those countries that should be "graduated" from the
GSP. The decision to postpone "graduation 11 for nearly a decade
representad a significant concession by Congress to both the
increasing importance of the advanced developing countries and
the debt crisis, which precluded a more rapid absorption into the
international trading system.
In September 1985, the Administration also adopted a
two-pronged approach to reduce the protectionist pressures.
First, President Reagan announced an aggressive strategy to
counter foreign governments that were using subsidies to capture
markets from U.S. exporters, and at the same time, he pledged
that the government would play a more active role to ensure that
U.S. industries would not be injured by imports thatarrived as a
resul t of unfair trade practices. S e con d 1 Y , a n d more
significantly, the Treasury Department changed its policy and
sought a fundamental realignment of exchange rates in
coordination with four other industrialized countries. 11
Within one year, as a resu1t of that decision, tha dallar
declined 55% in vaIua against tha Japanese yen and 40% against
11 U.S. Dapartment of state, "President Reagan: Trade
Policy Action Plan," September 23, 1985.
the West German mark.
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Despite the suceess in realigning
currencies, the U.s. trade deficit continued to worsen. By
Septembar 1986, some analysts predicted the 1986 trade deficit
would approach $200 billion, up fraro $148.5 billion in 1985. 12
In the third period of U.S. trade policy, most barriera
continued te decline, although non-tariff barriers were much
more resistant te reductions than tariffs. By 1983, U.8. tariffs
averaged about 5%, and one-third of U.S. imports enterad
duty-free. In september 1986, representatives of seventy-fqur
nations met in Uruguay and agreed to a new comprehensive agenda
tor an eighth round of international trade negotiati0ns.
II1.2 u.s. Policy on Foreign Direct Investment
1I1.2.1 Definition
Foreign direct investment (FDI) exists when at least ten
percent of the stock of a domestie corporation is held by a
person or organization. Ii the investment is less than
10%, it ls callad foreign portfolio investment. The threshhold
is based on an arbitrary judgment of the point at which equity
becomes control.
U.s. policy en foreign direct investment consists of all
.those measures, sta tements, and actions ( which "affect tha
.dlrection , flow, amount, or cemposition of international
investment.,.. Such a definition, while straightforward, deee not
beqin to suqgest the divarsity of policies that ara qrouped undar
12 clyde H. F'arnsworth, "Sharp D:rop in Dallar' s Value Fails
to cut U. S. Trade Deficit, 11 York Tilues, SElptember 19, 198 (5,
p. 1.
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the rubric of foreign investment policy. First, ene needs to
distinguish between U.'8. foreign investment abroad (referred here
as "outward investment") and foreign investment in the U.S.
(referred here as "inward investment"). Secondly, in discussing
outward investment, one needs to distinguish between halance of
payments policies (generally to restrict the outward flow of
capital) and policies aimed at promoting and protecting U.S.
investment abroad. Thirdly, in discussing inward investment
policies, there are a host of distinctions one must make--
between local, state, and federal policies: between differential
and national treatment (the latter occurring when a foreign
investor is treated as an American investor); and between
promoting, restricting, and regulating foreign investors.
Given the diverse purposes of foreign investment policies,
one should not be surprised that there has been significant
discrepancies and inconsistencies between these policies. In the
early 1960s, for example, President Kennedy tried to stop the
flow of U.S. capital abroad (mostly to Europe), while at the same
time, he was encouraging the private sector to invest $10 billion
in Latin America. While the U.S. Department of state criticized
Latin America for nationalizing or excluding U.S. mineral
investments, officials in the Department of Interior and in
state governments applied stringent and selective control s
on foreign investments in the united states.
Not until the mid-1970's did the U.S. government even begin
to think of ita outward and inward investment policías as related
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to ona another. Before then, the U.S. governm.nt aven usad
diffarent criteria to define outward and inward investments.
Government analysts now not only recognize the need to establish
sorne consistency in policy between inward and outward investment,
but they also recognize the relationship between trade
foreign investment, and both of these and the value of the
dallar.
One needs to distinguish between six distinct outward
investment policies: (1) balance of payments policy aimed at
discouraging the outward flow of U.S. capital; (2) the
encouragement by guarantees, credits, and diplomatic assistance
of foreign investment as a supplementary tool to assist economic
development¡ (3) strategic prohibitions against certain kinds of
investments in communist countries; (4) tax policies on U. S.
multinational corporations, which may encourage, discourage, or
not affect u.S. foreign investment; (5) the extra-territorial
application of U.S. laws like antitrust and securities
disclosure; and (6) the use of foreign investors as overt and
covert instruments of American diplomacy. In addition, one might
consider the full range of domestic policies-- industrial palicy,
rnanpower policy, growth policy, etc.-- as affecting both domestic
and international investrnent decisions.
Some of these policies aim to encourage U.S. investment
abroad, and sorne airo to restrict, regulate, or discourage
investment. Our main purpose in this section is to review
outward investment policy, focusing especially on the issues
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relatad to the.promotion and protection of U.S. foreign
investment abroad. It needs to be remembered, however, that in
the period afterWorld War II, U.S. Presidents spent much more
time concerned about the flight of U.s. capital overseas (because
of its effect on the balance of payments) than they did on issues
related to the promotion or protection of U.S. investment
overseas.
111.2.2 Evolution of Outward 1nvestment Policy
For the reasons noted aboye, the U.S. has not formulated
a systematic outward investment policy. Rather, the U.S. has
developed many different policies -- on taxes, balance of
payments, and promoting development and security -- which aim to
affect the international investment decisions of U.S.
corporations.
While it i6 commonly belíeved in Latín America that the
united states has encouraged foreign investment abroad in
response to demands by U.S. corporations to acquire more profits
and power, the facts suggest otherwise. During those periods
when U.S. policy has encouraged U.S. investment abroad, the
motive has been to assist those countries whose instability were
sources of national security concern in the united states. The
united states government also wanted to supplant European
investment not so much for economic reasons, but to preclude
European conflicts in the Americas. Even during the "dollar
diplomacy" period of William Howard Taft, the U.S. government
found itself in the uncomfortable position of encouraging
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reluctant U.S. banks to invest in Central America.
In 1939, Adolf A. BarIa, a formar Assistant Secretary of
for Affairs, reflected on the past
relationship between the U.S. government and U.S. business
abroad:
" ••• the intervention of American capital in
Central America and in the West Indian republics was
undertaken not at the instance of American capitalists
seeking ol1tlet for their funds. It was undertaken at
the direct instance of the American government, and the
motive appears to have baen the fear least European
capital, affected by European politics, might find a
foothold on this side of the Atlantic ... " 13
Further proof of this conclusion is that U.S. efforts to
encourage foreign investment haya always been directed at
unstable areas where American businessmen are particularly
reluctant to invest. After World War II, the U.S. first promoted
foreign investment in Western Europe. As an adjunct to the
Marshall Plan, the D.S. implemented an insurance
and guarantee program aimed at reducing the non-conooercial risks
of war, expropriation, and currency nonconvertibility for the
prospective investor. 14
After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, U.S. attention shifteq
to the developing world, particularly Latin America. The centra¡
purpose of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progre ss was to
13 cited in Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy Qf
the united states (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1943),
p. 167.
14 C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst, and Theodore H. Moran,
American Multinationals and American Interests (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 24. -
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promote economic and social development in order to address the
root causes of leftist, un-American revolutions.
The Alliance was aimed to promete economic development,
social reform, and political change. U.s. private investment
played an impertant role for two reasons. First, North Americans
believed that the private sector offered the mest efficient path
toward economic development, and by widening the base of
political pluralism, the private sector also contributed to the
reinforcement of democracy. Second, the U.S. understood the
limits of public aid, and viewed prívate investment as a
necessary addition to those scarce resources. As President
Kennedy said in 1962: "Private capital is necessary in Latin
America. .. There isn' t enough public capi"tal to do the job." 15
Expropriations of U.S. investments in Cuba and in other
countries in Latin America threatened both V.S. investments and
Kennedy's strategy for encouraging more. There was therefore a
censen sus on the need te respond te this threat, although
initially, there was disagreement on the best response.
In 1962, Cengress passed an amendment, subsequently namad
for its spensor, Senator Bourke Hickenloeper ef Iowa, to the
Foreign Assistance Act reguiring the President te suspend V.s.
assistance to a country if it expropriates U.s. foreign
investment and does not make provisions tor "prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation." The state Department initially
15 Fapeks F. "News
Conference," 7 March 1962, p. 75.
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opposed the amendment, but reluctantly accepted it after the
Senate agreed to allow the Executive sorne disoretion in its
implementation. Both conservatives and liberals endorsed
Híckenlooper's amendment, which passed by voiee vote. Senator
.Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) explained why it received such wide
agreement in Congress: !lIt was an amendment which I believed was
needed to counter the reckless abandon that seented to be
prevailing in certain countries relating to the expropriation of
American property ... [If this behavior goes unpunished] a fire
[will be] ... set loose, which will consume the values and
principIes for which this country stands." 16 In acldition, the
v.s. strengthened its insurance program for foreign investors.
The Executive Branch accepted the intent of the Hickenlooper
amendment, but instead of tenlinating aid to governments that
nationalized u.s. investments, the state Department applied
pressure privately. When this was ineffective, the Department
sought alterative ways to raisa the costs to developing countries
that expropriated U.s. corporations without compensation. Over
time, Congress al10wed the President broader authority and
discretion to apply the amendment.
However, U.S. investors, as we shall see, gradually shifted
their investments in Latin America out of extractive industries
and into manufacturing and out of smaller, vulnerable nations to
16 congressional Recorc;l, 11 February 1963, p. 2136. For
the origins of the amendment, see Charles Lipson, ptanding
Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital iD the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centyrias (Berkeley: University of California Prese, 1985),
Part II.
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those with the largest internal Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina. In general, most multinational corporations
(sometimes referred to as transnational corporations) showad a
clear preference to increasing their investments in the
industrialized rather than the daveloping nations.
As a result of the shift in the direction of investments and
the decline in the number of investment disputes, there was less
reason for the U.S. government to formulate new policies toward
outward investment. At the same time, in the mid-1970s,
criticism of the activities of multinational corporations (MNC's)
increased in the U.S. The labor movement argued that MNC's
exportad jobs, and while not necessarily agreeing with that
argument, many Demoerats were more sensitive to it.
Therefore, when the Carter Administration took offiee, it
reviewed the overall question of whether the U.S. should promote
investment abroad. There were no serious security erises that
would haYa required the U.S. to ancourage foreign investment as a
supplement to foreign aid. Therefore, the Carter Administration
issued a new position, asserting that it would "neither promote
nor discourage inward or outward investment flows or aetivities."
In 1981, the Reagan Administration perceived a very sarious
security threat in the Caribbean Basin. Its principal stratagy
was to combat that threat militarily, but its poliey evolved to
take into account political, social, and economic aspecta oi the
crisis. Initially, it promoted foreign invastment in tha
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Caribbean -as the enly way te premete develepment, 17 and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which was first anneunced in February
1982, was mainly.directed toward promoting increased foreign
investment by lowering trade barriers for exports to the U.S.
fram the Caribbean.
On september 9, 1983, the Reagan Administration issued a
comprehensive statement on International Investment: Poliey, which
appeared te try to connect Reagan's promotion of investment with
his predecessor's more neutral posture. The statement recognized
"the vital contribu·tion of international direct in7es'tment flows
te economic growth and development and the benefit to home and
host country al ike. " Then, it suggested a somewhat neutral
posture by asserting that "direct investment flows should be
determined by market forces," but it concluded on a very
activist note, strongly opposing any barriere to foreign
investment. The Administratien also indicated that it would
support "multilateral eiforts oto develop appropriate princ.1-ples
ef behavior for governments and MNC' s. " r. S. wculd onJ.y
support codes or guidelines that were voluntary and that didn't
discriminate against MNC's in favor of purely national
enterprises. 18
17 Juan de Onis, liD. S. Caribbean Plan to stress Private
Investment," New York Times, June 14, 1981, p. 23.
18 U.S. Department of state, Bureau of PUblic Affairs,
9IST, "International Investment Policy," January 1984; and
"Multinational Corporatíons," March 1986.
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U.s. Foreign Aid Policy
1II.3.1 Definition and Purposes
u.S. foreign .aid policies are those decisions involving the
amount, conditions, composition, and direction of grants or
loans oi capital, technical, technological, and managerial
resources ·from the U.S. to other governments. The United States
provides aid directly (bilateral aid) and through its
contributions to international and regional development banks,
the united Nations and its agencies, and non-governmental
organizations.
Bilateral aid consists of loans and grants made for economic
and security purposes. Economic aid is disbursed through the
Agency for 1nternational Development (A.I.D.), Food for Peace
(PL-480: Title I is repayable in loans in either dollars or local
currency; Title II is a grant), and Peace Corps. Military aid
is used for training (IMET), balance of payments support
(Economic Support Fund) , and loans and grants for military
equipment.
From 1946 to 1984, the united states transferred more than
$174 billion in economic aid ($53 billion in loansí $121 billion
in grants) and $106 billion in military aid ($31 billion in
loansí $75 billion in grants). The total of $281 billion in
economic and military aid does not include loans from the
Export-Import Bank, which amounted to $48 billion. 19
19 D.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. OVerseas
Loans and July 1, p. 84.
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Historically, wealth has generally been transferred from the peor
and weak to the stróng and rich. The transfer of over $281
billion in forty years from the strongest nation in the world to
the poor nations is unprecedented both in scale and duration.
The U.S. has also played a leadership role in developing
and supporting the international development banks. sinee 1945,
the World Bank has loaned over $130 billion to the developing
countries. The U.S. has been the largest eontributor to the
Bank, currently aceounting for over 25% of the funds. The
International Development Association (IDA) has provided more
than $37 billion in credits on coneessional terros to the poorest
countries in the world. The International Finance corporation
(IFC) of the World Bank mobilizes resources for private sector
development in the Third World, and the cumulative total of its
loans has been $5.6 billion. The Inter-American Development has
mada over $25 billion of loans to Latin America and the
Caribbean. In addi tion, the U. S. contributes to the united
Nations Development program, which has loans over $5.5 billion;
the Asian Development Bank, which has loaned over $14 billion;
and the African Development Bank, which has loaned over $3
billion. 20
Foreign aid serves numerous purposes, including the
following: (1) promoting economic, social, and political
development and military security; (2) influencing a
government's policy; (3) promoting or protecting U.S. foreign
20 U.S. A.I.D., Overseas Loans, 1984, pp. 4, 192.
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investors; and (4) creating markets for agricultural surp1us or
other. U.S. exports.
Since al1 of these goa1s cannot be accomp1ished
simu1taneous1y, po1icy-makers must choose between them; they must
weigh the relative value of each goal and rank them in a
hierarchy of priorities. For examp1e, an Administration that
gives a higher priority to fighting Communist insurgencies than
to promoting human rights is 1ike1y to give more aid to countries
facing an insurgency than to other.
Foreign aid is often the most significant instrument for
promoting u.s. interests in a particular country. Therefore, the
decision-making process for determining the amount and conditions
for giving foreign aid is of major importance, and it is the
resu1t of an interactive process involving Congress and the
President. Requests for foreign aid reflect the different
weights each administration attaches to different goa1s.
Congress does not a1ways agree with the Administration's
priorities, and therefore, the debate between the President and
Congress on foreign aid is often among the most serious foreign
policy debates each year.
II1.3.2 Evolution of U.S. Foreign Aid Policy
Since World War II, U.S. foreign assistance policy has
paseed through three stages, which have, to a certain extent,
overlapped, but which have been aimed at different goa1s and
recipiente. During each phasB, there was a change in the
relative distribution between economic and military aid, the
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qeoqraphical focus, and the purposes of aid.
During the first phase, froro 1945-52, the principal
objective of U.s. foreign assistance policy was the relief,
reconstruction, and recovery of Western Europe. More than $34
billion was appropriated for that purpose, of which more than
$22 billion were grants for economic aid. The rest of the funda
included loans, and a relatively small amount for military
assistance.
The passage of the European Recovery Program-- or the
Marshall Plan-- in March 1948 by Congress was the beginning of
the foreign aid program, but it was not the beginning of U.S. aid
to Europe. From 1940 to August 17, 1945, the United states
21
transferred more than $41 billion of resources, mostly war
materiel, to its European allies, and for the three postwar years
prior to the Marshall Plan, the United states gave $6 billion in
grants and $8.5 billion in credits.
The second phase of the U.S. aid program began with the
passage of the Mutual Security Act in 1951 during the Korean War.
During this phase, the U.S. airned to strengthen the military
capabilities of its a11ies en the rim ef the Soviet Union and
China. Between 1951 and 1961, over $48 billion was
the vast majority being grants, and the slight majority was for
military aid. The principal recipients were South Korea, Taiwan,
the Philippines, Indo-China, Iran, Turkey, and Greeca. While
21 Congress iona.l Quarterly, Congxess and the Nªt;ion, VoL
I, 1945-64, p. 167.
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the shift from Europa te Asia was noticeable, an even clearer
illustratien of the 'shift in priorities occurred in 1950 when
military assistance as a ratio of economic assistance changed
from 1: 4 to 4: 1.
In 1961, with the passage of the first Foreign Assistance
Act, the united states once again altered the geographical
direction of its foreign aid policy-- this time to the developing
world. This period, which began in 1961 and continues to the
present, can be divided into three parts. During the first
decade, U.S.policy and aid concentrated on Latin America and the
Caribbean. President Kennedy announced a 10-year, $10 bil1ion
A1liance for Progress, and although he died, his successor
completed the commitment. The ratio of economic to military
aid to Latin America in the decade of the 1960s was more than
10: 1.
In the second decade -- and phase-- of the Foreign
Assistance Act, the U.S. reduced its bilateral aid program to
Latin America and concentrated it in three countries: Vietnam
(1965-75, receiving $21 billion), Israel ($18.7 billion froro
1962-80), and Egypt ($7.6 billion from 1962-80). For all intents
and purposes, the bilateral aid prograro became two separate
programs: most of the money went to these three countries as
well as to several others with whom the U.S. had military base
agreements. The rest of the development assistance was alloeated
to help meet the "basie human needs" of the poorest people in the
poorest countries. This latter strategy was proposed by Ccngress
in the 1973 foreign aid law.
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Atthe same time, the U.S. began
to give a higher priority to the internationa1 deve10pment banks.
With the onset of the Reagan Administration, U.S. aid
policy shifted to a third phase. In 1981, the U.S. reduced ita
support for the international development ban]cs by 25%, increased
and further politicized its bilateral aid program, and íncreased
military aid in absolute as well as relative terms. Naturally,
those regions, which the Administration perceived to be in the
most desperate security situation-- like Central Aroerica and the
Caribbean-- received increased amounts of aid. In the
Adroinistration's 1986 budget, bilateral aid accounted tor 92% of
total foreign aid, and the percent of total foreign aid devoted
to roilitary and security aid had increased froro 25% in 1980 to
40%. 22
In September 1985, Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker
III presented a plan to assist developing nations to adjust to
the debt crisis. The plan proposed that the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank increase loans to debt-burdened
countries and monitor their adjustment policíes. To implement
the Plan, the Reagan Administration promised to increase its
contribution to the international development banks, presaging a
return to the high priority, which previous administrations had
given to the banks.
22 Robert S. McNamara, "The Role of the Multilateral
F inance Insti tutions in Development Assistance," statement
before the Rouse Subcommittee on International Development
Institutions, BanJdng and Currency Committee, September 9, 1985.
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IV. Ths Question of Coherence and consistency
"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds
Adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
divines."
Ralph Waldo Emerson
In trying to identify futura trends and policies, one is
inevitably drawn to questions of whether the past policy has been
consistent and eoherent. Let us examine eaeh of the issues and
then seak soma general conelusions about the coherenee of U.S.
foreign economie poliey.
IV.l Trade Poliey
There are two views about whether U.S. trade poliey has been
eoherent or noto The first eoneentrates on the major trade laws
passed by Congress from 1934 to the present, and on the trends
of world trade. It coneludes that U.S. trade poliey has been
relatively consistent, liberal, and coherent. During the last
fifty years, U.S. tariffs declined from over 50% to less than 5%,
and U.S. and world trade expanded at mueh more rapid rates than
world production, thus tying the world mueh more elosely together
than ever before. Congress has simultaneously expanded the
President's authority to negotiate the reduction oi trade
barriers and pressed him to use all the tools available to him to
persuade U.S. trading partners to lower their barriers to U.S.
goods. The result has baen an international eeonomic system that
is the larqest and freest in world history.
Another view holde that the movement toward fraer trade has
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been inconsistent, incoherent, and predominantly protectionist.
Generally, five arguments are used in defense of this position.
Let us review and.analyze each of them.
First, these analysts have tended to give greater weight and
importance to the proliferation of voluntary export restraint
agreements than, for example, to important trade laws or to the
increase in world trade and the general decline in trade
barriers. Voluntary export restraint agreements (VERA's) have
restricted trade in textiles and apparel, steel, footwear, some
electronic products, and automobiles. As per capita income
increased in the U.S. and its trade barriers declined, many
labor-intensive industries felt the harsh ehí1l of international
competition and pressured the government to restrain such trade.
In order to maintain support for freer trade policies, and to
pass important trade legislation, every President since
Eisenhower has had to accept VERA's in sorne sensitive sectors--
especially textiles and steel. It was felt that a minar
restriction on trade was worth the price of obtaining a major
advance on trade legislation.
In assessing whether U.8. trade policy has been more open or
protectionist, one needs to judge which is more important-- the
VERA's or overall trade policy? While VERA's have been
negotiated on important commodities, these are very few as
compared to the thousands of commodities that currently crosa
U.S. bordere with a trivial duty, or none at all. Moreover, U.S.
and world trade haya generally increased at fastar rates than
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U.S. and world production. 23
In a recent study on non-tariff barriers, two economists
from the National.Planning Association concluded that NTB's had
not grown to the same importance as tariffs, which have sharply
declinad overall. They found "protection provided by the
NTB's 1ike tariffs, appears to be declining." .They
estimated that as a result of the Tokyo Round of trade
negotiations, the overall protection afforded U.S. manufacturing
fram the tariffs and the NTB's would be about 28% lower in 1985
than it was in 1976. 24
Second, there is a tendency to dismiss all voluntary export
restraint agreements as "protectionist" wi thout looking more
closely at their cause, their purpose, or their effect on trade.
Most VERA's are negotiated after a "surge" in imports threaten to
dismantle an entire industry. It is useful to keep in mind as a
point of comparison that while most developing countries exclude
all imports that could compete with a domestic product, the U.S.
VERA's all accept a high-level of import penetration.
For example, the U.S. negotiated an agreement with the
23 From 1950 through 1975, trade among industrialized
countries increased at an average annual rate of 8% while growth
was half of that. only in 1981 and 1982 did the pace of world
production-- slowed by global recession-- exceed that of trade.
[C. Fred Bergsten and William R. eline (ed.), Trade Policy in
the 1980s (Washington, D. C.: Institute for Internationa1
Economics, 1982) f p. 14J
24 Peter Morici and Laura L. Megna, U. S . Economia Policies
Af fe c t i...1l.fL I n d u s tri a 1 T r a de: A Qu a n.t ita tiveAs s e s s me TI t
(Washington, D. e.: National Planning Assaciation, 1983), pp.
97-103.
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Japanase on oara in 1982 only afterJapanese cars increased thair
snare of the markat from 6% in 1971 to 12%' in 1978, to 22% 111
1981. The U.s. did not insist that the Japanese stop all
exports or reduce their market share to 10%, but only that the
U.S. auto industry haya time to adjust and adapt without being
overwhelmed.
Similarly, while restraints on trade in textiles haya
existed for several decades, this hardly prevented substantial
trade, modernization, and adaptation in the international
industry. U.S. imports of man-made fiber textiles and apparel
rose in value from $129 milI ion in 1964 to $1.6 billion in 1971.
During the decada ending in 1983, textile and apparel imports
increased by an average of 6% per year on a volume basis; they
increased 25% in 1983 and 32% in 1984. U.5. employment in the
textile industry continued its sharp decline, but the overall
industry adapted and modernizad. 25
VERAls do not prevent trade, nor do they protect markets
fram all competition. They do, however, restrain trade, and
while that imposes costs on consumers as wall as exporters,
there are also very substantial costs that ara paid by trade-
impactad industries when "surges" occur. The key questions
relatad to VERA's would seam to be npt whether they restrain
trade-- of course, they do-- but what effect do they have en
25 Robert Pastor, "The Cry and Sigh 5yndreme: Congress and
Trade Policy," pp. 187-188 ¡U. S. Department of state, "GIST:
Protectionism," February 1986; and U.S. Department of State,
lIGIST: Textile Import Control Pr:ogram," March 1986.
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trade? Do the VERA' s reduce the rnarket shara tor a particular
import, or do the VERÁ's perrnit rnanaged growth? If the VERA's
permit managed growth, and most of them do, then to dismiss them
as "protectionist" is misleading and unproductive. A more
effective approach would be to focus on two dimensions of the
VERA's: the margin of growth permitted by VERA's, and the
duration of the agreements. Developing countries ought to aim
to try to widen the margin of growth of VERA's and limit their
termo
Third, those who see an incoherent or protectionist policy
tend to view the irnplementation of "escape clause" provisions or
unfair trade practicas as protectionism. However, international
trading rules under GATT have always accepted the principIes of
relief for industries injured due to imports (escap& clause) and
compensation for unfair trade practices (either dumping or
subsidies). To disrniss anti-dumping procedures or countervailing
duties as "protectionist" is to ignore the rules of the game,
whose purpose is to maintain the integrity of the entiresystem.
Fourth, there is a tendency to confuse a petition to the
International Trade Commission for relief with a decision, and
the introduction of a bill or resolution in Congress with the
passage of alaw. As we noted previously, in thinking about
petitions and Congressional resolutions, one has to ctistinguish
between signals (or warnings) and poI icy. There have been
thousands of protectionist bilIs that have been
introduced by Congressmen during the last fifty years, yet only
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iSElues en the international trade agenda at this time. It is
quite trua that the sólutien to these new issues will take time
and will require much more work in defining the problem. But
these issues are aetually a sign of the suceess oi the interna-
tional trading ·system rather than a sYlJU2tom of i ts imminent
eollapse. It is only beeause tariffs and other barriers to trade
have declined so sharply and the world has grown so interde-
pendent that these new and difficult non-tariff barriers are even
oz:t the agenda.
In brief, and despite these very real reservatiens that
have been raised, ene ean still identify a eoherence and
eonsistency in U. S. trade policy sinee 1934. The U. S. aims to
reduce the barriers to trade-- not as quiekly as economists would
like, nor as slowly as deelining industries demand-- but there
no doubt of the direetion of trade barriers-- down-- and
trade-- up. And most agree that lower trade barriers and a
trade policy aimed in that direction have eontributed to U.S.
prosperity.
In sum, therefore, the poliey does yield a eertain eoherenee
and consistency. It is aimed at freer and fairer trade, not free
trade. Poliey-makers pursue the good in trade policy, not the
They compromise· on the margins of trade policy in order
to preserve the central features.
IV.2 The Incoherenee of U.S. Investment Policy
U.S. outward investment policy is actually an amalgam of
policies aimed at different purposes. Little wonder that it
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appears incoherent, inconsistent, and lackingany concewtual
ciarity. This incohérence is multiplied if one includes inward
foreign investment policy. Indeed, U.S. outward investment
policy opposes the Calvo Clause, which insists on exclusive host
government legal jursidiction for investment disputes, while U.S.
inward investment polioy appears to Bccept it.
Each of the strands of U.S. outward investment policy has
its own consistency and coherence, and is administered by
different agencies. At times, one of these strands, for example,
balance of payments considerations in the 1960s, has been more
important than the others. still at other times, other policies,
fer example on investment disputes, seemed te dominate the
thinking ef policy-makers. But there has never been a systematic
effert te formulate a single policy and assign it to a single
agency to be implemented.
OVer time, U.S. eutward investment policies had much less
impact on U.S. investment decisiens than the inward policias of
Latin American governments, and these policíes probably had less
impact than the general political climate and stability of a
country. (However, Latin policies were obviously related to the
political stability of the country.) One should also not ignore
the importance of economic criteria -- market, labor costs and
productivity, taxes, and technology-- as factors influencing
investment decisions of multinational corporations. Indaed,
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economia factors are generally the most importante 26
IV.3 The Many Consistencies of Aid Policy
It is difficult to locate the coherence in U.S. aid policy
because, as with investment policy, it serves so many diverse
purposes. Nonetheless, the one thread that runs through the
three phases of U.S. aid policy is that the U.S. transferred
enormous amounts of resources abroad to gain influence and to
promote development and security among its vulnerable friends.
During the Marshall Plan, when its allies were most
vulnerable, the U.S. was prepared to offer the largest amount of
aid (as a % of its GNP). During the second phase, the threat was
still viewed as immediate (although perhaps not so urgent as
during the first phase), and the U.S. provided large quantities
of military aid to those countries bordering the Soviet Union and
China. And finally, in the third phase, the threat was more
remote and perceived as related to poverty; as such, the V.S.
refocused its efforts at promoting long-term development. ·As the
V.S. perception of the threat in the developing world changed in
recent years so too did the composition and objectives of the
aid programo
In brief, there was a coherence and consistency to U.S.
foreign aid policy, provided that one defines it in the broadest
terms: to use U.S. resources to help friends and deter enemies.
26 See Robert Pastor, U.S. Foreign Investment in Latin
America: The Impact on Employment (Buenos Aires: Institute for
Latin American Integration, Inter-American Development Bank,
1984). Also published in spanish as "La Inversion de Estados
Unidos en America Latina: sus Effectos En El Empleo."
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¡V.S The coherence ot Foreign Eaonomio
The question of whether U.s. foreign economia policy yields
a certain coherence depands partly on how ona defines the policy
and partly on tha level of genarality one seeks. A poliey can
be dafined in such general terms that it will always sound
coherent, or it can be disassembled into micro-policias, which
will appear incoherent beeause each "miero-policy" pursu€?s a
different objaetive.
This i8 particularly true of "foreign economic poliey,"
which i8 such an expansive umbrella that it eovars many policias
with very little in common. If ona definas "coherenee" in terms
o f whether poI ieies share purposes, then "foreign economie
poliey" i8 hopalessly and unavoidably ineoherent. Too many
policias pursue too many purposes, and there are times when
these purposes cross each othar.
However, if one is prepared to accept minar inconsistencies
in order to posit a more general statement about U.S. foreign
economic policy, then such a statement can be identified: in thQ
post-war per iod I U. S. foreign economic 2..91 icy has aimed to
advance U.S. interests in a treer and more prosperous world by
lowering barriers to trade and investment and
However, the pursuit of lowered barriers has not
indiscriminata nor urgent, and the to deve19pment
with. each Adm1nistratiotL.lUl9. __ threat _'t;Q
J.h.S..!- !HH:n.u:i ir'l'ta.reste..t.
If one aooapts this statement as aoourate, than is an
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overarching coherence to U.S. economic policy, ano it is
one that ofters hopa to thosa who believe that the U.S. should
link its future with that of the world's.
V. current Issues and Debates
In this part, we shall examine the trends and changes that
are occurring in the world in each of the three issues-- trade,
investment, and aid-- and the policy implications of these
changes.
Foreign economic policies are answers to the questions
raised by new trends in the global economy. However,
decision-makers enj oy considerable lattitude in choosing which
trends and issues to address and how to approach them. For
example, although the U.S. budget,deficit iswidely recogriized as
a significant problem for the U.S. and world economy, the Reagan
Administration has largely avoided the issue. .There are also
many iasues, such as tha U.S. trade deficit, that do not land
themselves to any simple solution. Indeed, the devaluation of
the dollar seemed to have had very little favorable impact on the
U.S. trade deficit.
Our purpose is to how the debates on policy are
most likely to evolve so that we can to anticipate shifts in
policy. While there is no guarantee that an understanding of
changes in the world will open a window to the policy debate, or
that an understanding oi the debate will permit one te influence
i t, non e th e less, i t i s clear that a better p icture of the
political landscape could help one to avoid the obstacles and.
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take advantage of the opportunities. One can do that best by
first detecting ahifts in the world and then identifying the
current debates, the alignment of interests and forces, and the
ways in which tha policy-making process can affect the outcome of
the debate.
V.l U.S. Trade' Policy: Trends and Issues
From the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of trada negotiations
in 1979 to the next formal meeting of representatives of seventy-
four nations of GATT in Punta del Este in September 1986, thare
were signficant changas in world trade, but trada policy failad
to adapto The Declaration that was issued at the conclusion of
the GATT meeting on September 20, 1986 defined the new agenda
for the eíghth round of international trade negotiations.
The deadline for completion of next round of negotiations
ie four years frem October 31, 1986, when the negotiations will
ofticially begin. 27
The issues on the new agenda reflect many of the changes in
the international economy and the recognition that the
internationaltradíng system needs new rules to cope with these
changes. Let us review the changes in the system and the current
agenda.
Y;l,l Increasing Importance of Traqª
In al1 but two years sinee the second world war,
27 For exoerpts from the GATT deolaration ano a report of
the elose of the oonferenoQ, see Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Widar
Trade Talks Urged as Impetus to World G):owth, 11 New York 'rimes,
September 21, pp. 1, 11.
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international trade has consistently grown fastar than the wOl':ld
producto During the deeada of the 1970s, the U.S. doubled ita
dependence on trade, and while the rate of increase may not be
sustained, U.S. trade appears likely to Qontinue to grow
than the U.S. groBs national producto Trade in the develeping
countries, particularly the newly industrialized enes, will grow
still raster relative to world trade and relative to the growth
of their grass national producto
As important as the increase in trade is the growing
acceptance throughout the world of two facts. First, 1;:rade
is an angina for economic growth. Those countries with the mast
rapid rates of growth of trade have also experienced the most
rapid rates of economic growth. Secondly, to stimulate trade, a
country not only needs to gain access to other markets, but it
needs to open its own markets in order to become competitive.
A measure of the growing awareness of these two insights is the
increase in interest in joining GATT.
(1) lssue: Membership
GATT has grown dramatically-- from twenty-two members in
1948 to ninety-two in 1986. Although the Soviet Unian had
previously denounced GATT, it is currently requesting to observe
or parficipate in the organization's deliberations. The
involvement of countries, which trade through state agencies and
price their products outside af the market, present new problems
for the international trading system.
Actually, state-controlled economies pose many of the sama
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that are currently being debated in GATT, but they pose
them much more $harply. For example, the increased role of the
state in al1 countries combined with dec1ining trade barriers
nave meant that a wider range of subsidies to a
industry might have more of an effect on internationa1 trade.
GATT has sti11 not satisfactorily answered the questions cf what
ie a subsidy, or what is an appropriate response by an importing
country to an export subeidy. These problems are much more
difficult to define and resolve when the state maintains complete
control of the economy.
(2) ¡ssue: Adjustment
As trade increases in importance, the oldest issue in
international trade will remain central and most resistant to
solution: how should the traditional sectors in the
stesl, autos, agriculture, textiles, shoes-- adjust te
international competition? Should trade be "managed"? Should
nations buffer these sectors with adjustment assistance and
subsidies? Should nations allow these industries te be eliminated
through international coropetition? Those are the key questions.
Previous experience suggests that all nations will feel coropel¡ed
te assist the declining sectors froro complete destruction, but
the question is whether the response prevents or permits orderly
change.
(3) Iseue: VERA's
In ita deolaration, GATT callad fer a standstill a
rollback en "trade restrictiva or distorting maasures." ¡t also
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called for the "eventual integration" of textiles and clothíng.
into GATT. This is a commendable long-tarro objective, but in the
short and medium-term, instead of trying to eliminate all
voluntary export restraint agreements, it might be adviseable to
negotiate on the margins of such agreements. Governments should
aim to increase the rate of growth of exports under the VERA's,
and to limit the duration of the agreements. Industries should
commit themselves to an adjustment plan during the interim
periodo
V.l.2 Greater Convergence oi Factor Prices
The increasingly important bonds tying nations together
through trade and investment are leading to a gradual convergence
of factor prices of labor and capital. This means that small
changes in the costs of production in one country-- either
through government policies or changes in the exchange rate--
could create a larga shift in trade with another country with
important and immediate consequences for employment and
production.
(4) Issue: Defining Subsidies
In the Tokyo Round of negotiations, the governments thought
they had completed work on codes involving subsidies, injury, and
dumping, yet almost none of these codes have been effective.
Part of the problem is that the terros have still not been defined
precisely enough to permit a verifiable and implementable
agreement. Therefore, the next round will have to return to
de f ini ti ons, sueh as (a) Wha t is a subs idy? (b) When is an
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industry "injured ll by eompetiton, and what is the appropriat.e
response? (e) What is "dumping?"
'7.1.3 Changing composition oi World Trade
There has been a definite struetural ehange in the eeonomies
of the industrializad countriep and the composition of their
exports. As manufaeturing facilities have either moved to the
developing world to take advantage of lower labor costs or llave
remained in the industrialized countries and becoros more
automated, the U.S. and other eeonomies have
shifted toward services, incIuding insurance, consulting,
computers, engineering, construction, inforroation,
communications, public relations, etc. About a quarter of the $2
trillion volume of international trade i5 now in services. The
united States Ieads in this 70% of its i5 now
accounted for by services, and one-third of its exports.
(5) Issue: Services
Developing countries are vary reIuetant to open their
to the new service industries until they have had an
opportunity to develop their own. There is also coneern that
these industries especially in computers and
telecommunications-- offer the u.s. the opportunity to inf¡uence
or even dominante these countries in new and undesireable ways.
On the other hand, the industrializad eountries, especially the
unitad states, ara raluotant to opan thair to goods from
developing countries un1ess there soma reciprocity.
53
(6) Issue:Trademarks andIntelleotual J?ropertv
With the increasing importance of the flows of information
across national boundaries, questions are once again being raised
about the protection of the product of inventors and authors. In
the attempt to obtain new technological capabilities, sorne
governments are requiring the wholesale transfer of new
technology without regard to existing laws on patents and
trademarks. Also, the publishing and reproduction industries
have facilitated counterfeiting of books and videos, creating new
problems for authors and producers as well. These issues will
be addressed in the next round of trade negotiations.
V.l.4 The Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICs)
In the last decade, sorne of the world's most dynamic
export-led economies have been the NIC1s-- South Rorea,
singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.
As these economies grow more competitive, the U.s. will
inevitably encourage their "graduation" to the full obligations
expected ef industrialized countries in GATT. If the NICls want
te compete with the U.S. in the u.s., then they have to permit a
more open market for U.S. goods. The debt crisis has forced a
postponement of this issue, but it will remain on the
international agenda.
(7) Issue: Graduation
Should the newly competitive advanced developing countries
"graduate" to full obligations in the GATT? Under what terms
andconditions?
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(8) !ssue: Free-Trade Areas
The U.S. has already negotiated a special one-way free
trade area with a number of countries in the Caribbean Basin.
The u.s. completed negotiations for a free-trade area between the
UoS. and Israel, and has begun similar negotiations with Canada.
A décade ago the U.S. would have considered each of these
initiatives a departure from GATT; now it considers these
initiatives as a way to stimulate GATT. These negotiations
obviously haya important implications for México.
V.l.S Convergence of Trade and Investment.
The distinction between trade and investment is likely to
break down in the future as multinational corporations increase
their relative share of world trade. Multinational corporations
not only account for one-third of the world product (in the
non-Communist countrias), but they haya come to world
trade. In the case of the United states, for example, multina-
tional corporations accounted for 90% of u.s. trade in 1977, and
in the case of the united Kingdom, it was over 80%. 28
Moreover, a second implication of this convergence in factor
prices is that trade in manufactured goods will grow increasingly
differentiated. What this means is that multinational
corporations will have a distinct advantage, developing
innovations in ene ceuntry and adapting them through their
28 unitecl N8:tions Centre on Transnational
TransnatiQnal Coraorations in World Third survey
(N.Y., 1983), p. 6.
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(9) lseue: Industrial and Sactoral Policies
During the 1980s, there was a short-1ived debate on
"industrial policy." In fact, the issue was defined in terms of
whether the U.S. should undertake economic pIanning-- either at
the macroeconomic or the microeconomic level-- as a way to either
protect declining industries or to advance ("target")
newly-emerging industries, like those of high technology. The
aversion to pIanning by President Reagan combined with his
served to move attention away from these issues, but
they will return, particuIarIy if a major new problem emerges in
a key industry. Should the U.S. heIp major industries that have
been adverse1y affected by imports, and if so, how? Should the
U.S. provide "seed" money or offer other stimuIi to assist those
new and innovative businesses that might someday be recognized as
the cutting edge oi modern business? If so, how?
V.2 U.S. InvestmentPolicy: Trends and lssues
Three important trends characterize the changes in the flow
of foreign investment in the last twenty years. 29 'l'he trends
suggest that U.S. foreign direct investment abroad is unlikely to
be a salient issue in the next decade. The prevailing mood in
the U.S. is that foreign investment in the U.S. is beneficial,
29 These trends and lssues are distilled from the following
sources: united Nations Commission on Transnational corporations,
Recent Developments Relatad to Transnational Corporations and
Intsrnational Economic Relations, Report to the Secretariat,
July 16, 1982 (E/C .10/1982/2); U. N. Centre on Transnational
Corprorations, Transnational Corporations in World Development:
Th i rd Survey (N. Y., 1983); and Robert Pastor, U. S. Foreign
Investment in Latín America: The lmpact on Employment, lnstitute
for Latin American Integration, 1984.
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and there ie to be any etrong roovement toward regulating
foreign investors in the U.S. either. after
considering the trends, one can identify a set of related
te U. S. pol icy
pelicy-makers.
V.2.1
on outward investment are likely te
30
Diminished Importélnce
The U.S. share of total world fDreign investment peaked ¡n
1960 when it about 59.1%. Today, it represents a
1 i ttle less than half of total world investment.
Japan haya increased their share most
Germany and
The U. S, ,
however, remains the largest foreign investor with $221.3 billion
in assets in 1982.
The growth of foreign investment 11 Latin .¿,\merlca has not
kept pace with the growth of the economias.
1981, Latin America's economy triplad .in size.
From 1960 to
From 1957 to
1980, U.S. foreign investment in the regian as a percent of Latin
American gross domestic product declined by roughly half, mainly
because of the larga growth of Latin economies. (Even
these figures are deceptive sinea a larga part of the foreign
investment by theU.S. in the 1970s was composad of financial
transfers to tax havens in the caribbean,) In brief, in tarms of
foreign investment, Latin America has not only declined in its
importance to the U.s., but U.S. investment has declined in
30 For an 01"1 and naw foro
foraiqn investmant, sea Theodore H. HCt'é'Ui afid 'font:d.bt.tte;>rs,
llivllting in. Davalopm@ntl. -....li1lat (New
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986).
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importance to Latin America.
(1) Iesue: The Nature of Protection
When the lives or property of U.S. eitizens or corporations
are harmed or jeopardized in a foreign eountry, the U.S.
Jovernment under international law has a responsibility to
protect them. The question is, how? In the early 20th century,
the U.S. sent cruisers, gunbeats, or marines te protect u.s.
citizens or eorporations. In the 1960s, the U.S. threatenl?d te
withdraw aid. In the 1970s, the U.S. eneouraged U.S. corpora-
tions to look after their own interests. As for the protection
of U.S. citizens, the U.S. government eould not abdicate its
respons ibi 1 i ty. Instead, i t negotiated exchange-of-sanctions"
treaties with foreign governmentsi this permitted American
eiti zens, who were conv ieted of erimes abroad, to serve their
prison terms in the U.S.
As U.S. investment in developing eountries declines in
importance for the U.S. and for other countries, and as the
relationship beeomes more balaneed, the key issue in the future
will inereasingly be how to rely on host governments to
U.S. citizens and eorporations abroad?
V.2.2 Geographica1 and Sectoral Shifts
There has been a shiftin foreign investment away from the
deve10ping countries toward the industrialized eeonomies. In
1950, 40% of a11 U.S. investment was in Latin Ameriea¡ by 1980,
on1y 18% was in the region. By the mid-1970s, nearly three-
quarters of al1 foreign investment was in the industrialized
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countries, and 26% in the developing countries. The U.S. became
not only the largest sourcs, but also the largest recipient of
foreign investment (over $100 billion by the end of 1982). About
60% of the foreign diréct investment originating the
united states ie now invested in it. 31
America accounts for about one-third of the gross
product of the Third World, but by 1980, it held more than 50% of
the stock of foreign investment and two-thirds of U.(3. investment
in the developing world. Developing countries also developed
sorne multihational corporations; by 1977, 20 of the top 483 firms
were from the developing world. The U.N. Centre on Transnational
Corporations, which was the majar saurce af data and research on
Transnatianal Corporations (TNC's), noted: "Direct investment ia
no longer a flow from the developed market· ec;onomies to
the developing countries, but it is also a mechanism for
promoting economic cQoperation among develaping cauntries." 32
Foreign investment gradually shifted away from the
extractive and natural resource sectors-- mining, petroleum, and
agriculture-- and toward manufacturing, services, and finance.
In 1950, 59% of all U.S. foreign investments in mining were in
Latin America, and 38% of petroleum investments were in Latin
America. By 1980, Latin America held less than 25% of all U.S.
investments in mining and less than 10% of petroleum
31 U. N. on 'I'ransnationG'.l Corporatiorla I 1..h.i:t:'Ji f
p. 18.
32 Ib;.LCl. / p • 22 •
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U.S. manufacturing in Latin America increased in value from $781
million in 1950 to $14.6 billion in 1980.
Latin America and the rest of the developing world gradually
replaced dependence on foreign direct investment with a new
relianee on commercial bank loans. Between 1967 and 1982,
foreign direct investment in developing eountries increased at
10% per year, but discounting for inflation, its real value
showed no increase. In contrast, private lending increased by
9.5% per year in real terros throughout this periodo 33 In 1970,
the developing world had assumed an external debt of $68 billion¡
by the end of 1985, the debt had risen to $865 billion, with
Latín America accounting for more tl1an $380 billíon. The
region's debt burden i6 its most dangerous and debilitating
crisis, requiring annual payments of as much as 40% of Latin
America I sexport earnings just to service the debt. This
has prompted some governments to adopt new policies encouraging
foreigndirect investments.
For a variety of reasons, multinational corporations have
begun to "unbundle" the foreign investment package-- management,
equi ty i technology, marketing, etc. There has been a growing
trend toward non-equity arrangements, such as licensing of
technology, construction contracts, turnkey and product-in-hand
contracts, andfranchising.
(2) Issue: National Treatment
As foreign direct investment has become more versatile and
33 World Bank, World Report, 1985, p. 26.
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adaptable, it has aleo bacome mora attractiva to the developing
co'Untries. A new concept has emerged - ... "national treatment" --
te address tha TNC acress national bordars. "National treatment"
refera to egual and non-discriminatory treatment between foreign
and domestic corporations. The industrializad countries favor
tha concept, but most daveloping countries fear that if they
treated TNC's like local corporations, the former would overwhelm
the latter. It is possible that the concept of Ilnational
tre9-tmentll might eventually play a role for foreign investment
policy similar te that played by the most-favered-nation
principIe in trada policy. And perhaps, during the negotiations
f.<;:>r acode of conduct, i t might be possible to develop a
two-tiered approach (similar to tariff preferences) on national
treatment of corporations in developed and developing nations.
III lssue: Encouragement or Neutrality
With the changes that have occurred in the composition and
direction of foreign direct investment, U.S. policy toward
outward investment has returned to a primary question: whether
to encourage, discourage, or affirm a neutral position. Each of
these options has important implications for other policies. If
the U.S. encourages foreign investment, then it must some
obligation for protecting it. If the U. S. discourages foreign
investment or ls neutral, then its arme length posture offers




During the last twodecades, a11 ef the nations of the world
have increased their regulation oi foreign investment. 34 In the
Third World, Latin America took the lead in nationalizing the key
seetora of natural resources y utilities, and communications.
of the industrialized countries, including' the U.S., had
already reservad these sectors in their own countries tor
domestic or state-run firms.) 'llhis trend toward inoreased
control undoubtedly discouraged some investments, and was
probably ane oí the reasons tor the shift away frem the
developing oount,ries andaway frem the extractive sector. But by
and larga, multinatiol1al corporations have made their investment
deaisions in Latin America ,using economia criteria-- larga
markets and low labor costo There has been more f6reign
investment in those developing countries with strict restrictions
but larga markets than in those countries with few or no
regulations and smal1 markets.
(41, ¡ssye: Conflicts' oi Jursidiction
By definition, the transnational corporation works in
several countries, and is therefore subject to more than one
legal jurisdiction. As ceuntries regulate more of· their own
economies, an important issue will be te develop a coordinated
response to the eligopolistic behavior of larga corporations
that aparate acroes bordara. with respect te the U,S. f the iesua
:3 4. U. N. e'entre for Transna tional corporat:i.ons,
Survey, p. 40.
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is whether to extend the Anti-Trust laws to activities by U.s. or
other corporations engaged abroad7
(5) lssue: Taxes
One consequence of transnational investments is that
governments need to decide how to divide the taxes on profits?
This is not only an issue for national governmentsi it involves
state and local governments. Indeed, the most difficult recent
tax issue -- the unitary tax rule-- was raisad by state
governments within the U. S • This issue is unlikely to yield to
any single or simple formula, but guidelines-- perhaps as part of
acode of conduct-- could reduce the area of disagreement.
y.) U.S. Aid Policy: lssues and Trends
There.are three key trends in the U.S. foreign aid program,
and each poses a different set of issues:
V.3.1 Bilateral Aid
First, the bilateral aid program is used tor,
political. and security purposes, and in the last few years, the
U.S. has 8tressed theimportance of bilateral aid more than
multilateral aid. Moreover, there has also been a significant
shift toward military aid.
(J.) IS8ue: DistributiQn
The issue for the future of bilateral aid more to
the political-security framework in which it 1s usad than to
economia development. The issue will therefore be whether the





with the exception of a period of neglect at the beginning
of the Reagan Administration, the U.S. has been consistently one
of the major supporters of the international development banks,
which will remain at the forefront of the global development
effort. In the early 1970s, U.S. bilateral aid amounted to
about $5 billion, while the international development banks
loan about the same amount. U.S. bilateral economic a¡d remains
at about the same level, while the international developmen"t
banks loan about $20 billion each year.
(2) Issue: The Futura of the Banks
The debate on the development banks will be many-sided.
Should more money be given to the development banks-- both
absolutely and relatively? Who should decide what direction the
International Development Banks should take? What development
strategy should be supported? 35
V.3.3 Private Sector Aid
Historically, the U.S. has encouraged private investment to
supplement the aid programo However, recently, the U.S. has
begun to use the aid program to foster private sector activities.
(3) Issue: Mixed Credits and Purposes
When the U.S. has tried to use the private sector for
public .purposes, it has sometimes found that the private sector
35 For a discussion of both seta of issues and sorne naw
id e a s, see. J"ohn P. 'Lew i s (ed.), Development strategies
Reconsidered (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986);' and
Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), Between Two Worlds: The World Bank's
Next Decada (Naw Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986).
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has triad to use the government ter ita own private
This ie to be expected, but the U.S. sheuld anticipate
suoh iesues and decide on the appropriate rules of the gama at
the beginning.
There are, of course, ways for the government to its
own assistance by combining ita aid in imaginative ways
privateinvestment. Here, the issue is whether new
of mixed credits-- some grants, some loans trom and
publio sources-- would be an effective for development.
VI. Policy Implications
\
"World images that have been created by ideas nave, li]<:e
switchmen (on a railroad] determined the tracks along whicn
action has been pushed ... "
Max
The answere to the questions posed by the current debates
in the U.S. on trade, investment, and aid will have important
consequences for Latin America and for inter-American relations:
--If the U.S. should choose to raise its trade barriere, the
prospects for Latin American export-led growth in the next decada
would be considerably diminished.
--If the U.S. should chooae to use its considerable
t.O Latin Amerioa to privatiza f¡l.ll pa.:r;astatal
corporations and to eliminate all
investment, that could affeot tha region's politioal
and infrastructural capacity.
65
the V.S. should choose to significantly reduce its
contribution to the international developroent banks, Latin
America would have significantly less resources for investing in
its future.
¡n brief, the outcomes of the current debates in the United
states on its foreign economic policies are crucial to Latin
Amer ica and to inter-American relations. It follows that
Latin America ought to monitor the debate and, at appropriate
moments, communicate its concerns and interests in the United
states in a legitimate and effective way. This is frankly
not only important to Latin America, but also to.the United
states because the debate in the U.S. is sometimes skewed toward
short-term and particularistic interests. If Latin America were
effective in articulating its long-terro interests in a more
producti ve economic relationship wi th the V. S., such, a message
might influence U.S. decison-makers to attach greater weight to
its long-terro national interests.
To be effective in the American political system, it is
necessary to understand the issues, follow the debate closely,
distinguish between the consensual values that undergird and
shape the debate and the superficial arguments made to·different
audiences, and identify the decision-makers and the Inoments when
in f 1uence is rnost effective. In this part, I will explain how
this can be accomplished while addressing the following three
sets of questions:
(1) how should the debat:e be monitored? What
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qus$tions :should be and to whom? what information should be
requested?
(2) pow can the debate be understood? How can one
distinguish between harmless bilIs and effeQtive efforts to
u.s. policy? How does the policy process wqrk? pow
important are interests, values, ideas, and bureaucratic' or
domestic politics? how can one tell the signals fromthe
policias --the man crying wolf froro the wolf at the qoor? Which
policies are most likely to effect America seriously anq
adversely?
(3) how can one the debate in Congrese, the
.Exa.c:utive, and in the public? What ie the best way to follów
and infIuence the administrative decision-making Process? how
can the isaue be posed so as to prodtiqe the most desireable
outcome f'or developing countries? What ls tl;le most appropriate
I
and effective way for Latin America to respond when a U.S.
company petitions the International Trade Commission for relief
against imports from Latin America? What should Latin
do to influence the U.S. to adopt policíes that would contribute
to en international economic system that would most favor the
interests of Latin America?
VI.l Observing and Monitoring the
Changes in the international economic system are rapidly
transmitted to eaoh country as either a cost or a benefit.
Genaral1y, the groups in the u.e. that f@el thm adversa changes
first are outsida of Washington, but in tima, they bring their
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eoncerns to the capital. Tracking new issues in the
hinterlands, therefore, is neither necesssary nor economical.
There are two better ways.
--First, one can speculate as to the new issues that
are emerging from a good analysis of economic trends.
--Secondly, one can monitor the Congressional debate.
Congressmen are elected tojudge the temper of their
constitutents' concerns¡ they are only re-elected if their
constitutents decide .that they are listening. Thousands of bilIs
are each year for no larger purpose than to
demonstrate to the people back home that their Congressmen or
Senators are aware of a group's predicament and want to help.
Therefore, the first place te begin monitoring newly
emergel'lt issues is in Congress. The congressional Record
provides daily record of the debates and votes in Congress, the
bilIs introduced, and the hearings held. The best place to find
concisa summaries of crucial debates is the Congressional
Quarterlv Weekly Report. The best single journal for reading
contemporary case studies en U.S. foreign economic policies is
the Nqtional Journal i these case studies identify the crucial
actors on each issue and describe the state-of-play. In
addition, there are several very good international economic and
law j ourml1s that follow the current debates.
W.shinqton im literally deluged by lobbyists, public
relations firme, and consultants, who produce many newsletters on
a wide range ot ieGues. International economía imsues are aman;
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the most wide1y discussed. One dOBe not need te re-d!scover OY
duplicate the work that is going on; a1l one needs te do is to
identify the best reporters (newsletters, consuJ,tants, etc r ) and
pay for that service. All the people who write such newsletters
Should be invited to demonstrate their services, and then those
which are the 1east expensive and most useful should be usad.
YI.2 Understandinq the Debate
Because there are more signals than policies in trade,
investment¡ and aid¡ it ls essantial to be aple to distinguish
between them. Which of the many bills introduced by Congrass are
likely to be accepted as pollcy? To answer this question¡
one nesds to understand how the decision-maklng process works.
Briefly, U.S. foreign economic policy ls the product of a
debate that is influenced by four factors: ideas¡ interests, the
mechanics ofdecision-making¡ and events or decisions.
VI.2.l Ideas ¿ Consensual Values.
One should not under-estimate the role of ideasor
consensual values in the debate. The most powerful ideas
conventional wisdom; they are consensual values or assumptions
about the world, which shape the way view issues. Each
of the issues we have discussed has a shared value.
VI . 2 . For the most important
idea or consensual value
,
U.s. prosperity is tied to treer
in the world. WhilG individual
e . g. congre s smen 81'ld Senators I may recommend rais ing U •.S.
barriers, Congress as a whole and the President will reject
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suoh proposals because of common perceptions of the history of
trade policy-- notably the disastrous consequences of Smoot-
Hawley. In a speech in October 1985/ Undersecretary of State
AlIen Wallis reminded his audience of smoot-Hawley, and then
said: "Ronald Reagan has experienced the same history, and I can
assure you that not once in many discussions of trade policy
have I heard him fail to refer to the Smoot-Hawley tariff and
its sequel." 36
This common perception has been reintorced by the power of
the idea that nations prosper by more competition rather than
less, by Iower barriers rather than higher.
perception combine to forro a consensual value.
The idea and the
However, there ls another side to that value, which ls
neglected only at the risk of misunderstanding the debate:
treer trade benefits the U.S. only if it is fairer trade.
"Fairer trade" means playing by the rules, and it has three
dimensions: First, fairer trade means that the U.S. does not
lower its barriers unilaterally; other nations must givethe. U.S.
comparable access to its markets if they want the u.s. to open
its markets. Secondly, fairer trade means that U.S. producers
will not be jeopardized by exports that are subsidized by home
govermnents. Thirdly, fairer trade means that the system should
continue to open, but only at a gradual pace. Dramatic "surges,"
sueh as when Japanese auto exports expanded from 12% of the U.S.
36 O.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public
Address by Under Secretary Allen Wallis, "0pen Markets: Key To .A
Stronger, Richer, and Freer America," October 10, 1985.
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dOm8St.ic market to 22% in. just three years are unacoeptable,
particularly if this occurs in a major industry. $ince the
paasage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934, Congress
has always insisted on the need for an "escape clause" to
pr.otect individual industries from "surges" and unfair trade
practicas. In 1948, the U.S. wrote this principIe into GATT.
The concern for "fairer" trade is often interpreted as
protectionism, but that is an error. Effective maintenance of
the international trading system requires respect for the rules,
and one of the most important set of rules 90ncerns the "escape
clause," which is designed to protect industries frolu "import
surges" and unfair trada practices. To ignore fairer trada ;i,.n
the quest for freer trada would be ultimateIy seIf-defeating.
VI. 2 .1. (2) For foreign investment policy L two
consensual values shape the debate in the U.S. First,
international corporations should receive "national
and secondly, other governments have the right ando the
responsibility to grotect their citizens and abroag.
Foreign investment policy has not been subjected to the kind of
intense debate over a protracted period as has occurreq with
trada policy. Therefore, investment policy is not only less
coherent, but these two consensual values rema in vague, imprecise
apd unhelpful as guideposts for international investment policy.
And indeed, much like freer and fairer trade, these two
principles of investment can ba viewad as contradiotory. How
can a u.s. corporation expect to be treated the sama as a local
71
corporation while dernanding special diplomatic assistance?
Nonetheless, to understand and influence the debate on U.S.
investment policy, one needs to begin by understanding these two
values.
For those Latin American governments that have problema
with both concepts, a good approach would be to examine the U.S.
inward (host government) investment policy. since there are
few, if any, Latín American multinationals that could be affected
by U.S. inward investment policy, Latin American governments
might want to seek advice from Europe on the maze of inward
investment policies applied by the U.S.
Through such an exercise, Latin Americans might not only
better understand the similarities between U.S. and Latin
American inward investment policies, but also the differences.
Moreover, it might help the U.S. to understand the Latin American
perspective better. If these differences in policy can be
justified clearly in terms of the different levels of
development, then both the U.S. and Latin America might make some
progress on developing rules that could be applicable to interna-
investment everywhere. In trade policy, the U.S. has
accepted a preference system for developing countries; perhaps a
comparable, two-tiered system might be possible for investment
policy as well.
VI.2.1 (3) For U.S. aid policy, the consensual
value that undergirds the debate i8 that the U.S. ought to gain
sométhing tor giving something. The various purposes of U.S. aid
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haya been. described aboye; in most cases, the U.S. hopes
to promote the development and security of friends and datar
A crucial distinction is between urgent interests and
long-term interests¡ increasingly, the bilateral program is
usad to serve the first; and the international development banks,
tha latter. From Latin America's perspective, it may thererore
be more adviseable to eneourage the u.s. to make largar
contributions to tha international deyelopment banks rather than
try to changa the direction of its bilateral aid programo
VI.2.2 Interests.
While some tend to speak of a nation's interests or its
security as if it could be written on a single tablet and placed
in a holy temple, the fact is that national security or a
nation's interest varies with its author. Presidente,
and Congressman-- all define the national interest differently
becausa of wQQ they are, where they sit, and when they
However, just because the "national interest" is not fixed and
finita dees not mean that it le entirely subjective. There are
certain facters-- geography, political culture, social mores and
divisions, among others-- that establish the parameters within
which individuals define the national interest.
Cognizant of these parameters, formar Secretary of state
Dean Acheson defined both the ende and the means of U.S. foreign
policy in a simple and unobjsctionable manner. Achason wrota
that U.S. national interests are "to maintain as spacious an
environment as possible in which free statBs might exist and
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flburish." The means should be "6ommon action with like-minded
statesto secure and enrich the environment and to protect one
another from predators through mutual aid and j oint effort. ,,37
Nonetheless, such a definition does not have much
operational significance; it dees not help, for example, to
decide the debates on the current issues. Indeed, people on
both sides of the debate could, and do, argue that the national
interest is better served by their approach.
The crucial question is what kind of nation do people
want? It is easier to define the national interest more
concretely after answering that question than before. If
North Americana want a nation that is prosperous, free, and
capable of leading the world toward prosperity and freedom, than
U.S. interests would be weighted on the sida of those who want to
lower barriers to trade and investment and make more investment
resources available to the developing world. As the most
powerful and wealthiest nation in the world, the U.S. should
welcome competition. Defined in that manner, U.S.national
interests converge with the consensual values or ideas that
undergird u.S. foreign economic policy.
However, in moni tor ing the debate in the U. S., i t is
important to recognize that there is a wholey different
definition of the national interest that would pull the U.S. in
a different direction. Some believe that U.S. interests in
37 Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in the
State Department (A Signet Book from New American Library,
1970), p. 923.
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fraedom prosperity are better servad by being les. opan te
the world and by giving less aid. Between these two definitions
11es thedebate and the capacity to influence it.
VI.2.3 -The Mechanics of PolicY-Making
The bureaucratics and mechanics of de,cisien-making-- the
procese by which the representativas of the American paople make
policy-- ensures that the debate on national interests will nevar
ba concealad. On the contrary, the process puts a premium on
open and vigorous debate. Collective interests seem most at
risk in sueh a deeision process, but in fact, they manage to
prevail over particular interests in almost every key
However, these public debates are prebably very confusing
those unfamiliar with the way the U.S. resolves such
There are many fissures in the political procesa that are
subject to influence. The differences between the Stqte Depart-
ment and the domestic departments-- like Commerce and Treasury--
are reflected in the diffe1,"ences various committees in
congress. Foreign governments will undoubtedly find a more
sympathetic hearing from those in the U. S. government-- liJee the
state Department or the Senate Foreign Relations committee--
whose orientation is international. But they haya made a serious
mistake if they fail to communicate with those departments and
congressienal cemmittees with a domestic orientation, or te aflow
those in the U. S. qOV'«1rnment lik61 tha I3ta,'ta DapartYMilnt to
one's case for them. An effective group or government will not
hesitate to communicate its concerns itself te every critical
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decision-maker.
Though there are many important debates on U.S. foreign
economia poliay in the government, the two most important
separate Congress and the President, and the Democratic and
Republican parties. One can identify certain biases or missions
in eaeh of these institutions that explains the role each plays
in the debate.
with regard to the issues of trade, investment, and aid
policias, Congress generally pushes the President to be more
sensitiva to declining sectors, mora aggressive with our trading
partners, more even-handed with petitions for relief from injured
industries, more concerned about foreign take-overs, more
protective of U.S. citizens and corporations abroad, and more
niggardly with aid. The president, in turn, tends to push
Congress to provida him more negotiating flexibility over longer
periods of time, to be more patient with our trading partners,
more aware of our general national interests in freer trade and
investment and less sensitive to particular interests, and more
generous in providing aid.
Each institution, in brief, guards one dimension of the
shared values of the united states, and thus neither institution
can claim-- though both do-- that they alone represent the
national interests of the U.S. Together, in debate, and by way
of a continuous interactive process, the two Brances negotiate
U.s. foreign economic policies. The process has worked well,
and the results therefore reflect the national interest.
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Ov.rall, the conse,quence of the debate has been that Congresa has
viven the President the discretion and the flexibility ha
he needs to pursue the national interest, and the President has
assurad Congress that he would not ignore or overlook particular
interests.
Whereas the debate between Congress and the President
mainly a struggle for prerogative, the debate between
and Republicans is more substantive, changing, and, of course,
pol:i, tical. Both parties seek to align themselves wi th the
American people , or rather what they perceive the American people
presently want and are likely te want in the future. While
adjusting to the public meod, neither party can stray teo far
from its constituent base, and thus, one can identify certain
political or ideelegical tendencies in both.
Republicans, particularly under President Reagan, have
sought to weld together two contradictory tendencies: to be
dedicated to less government while being activist. They try to
use the power of the atate te reduce the power of the state both
at home and abread. Therefore, theoretically, thay airo to reduce
government expenditures and reduce and eliminate a11
international barriers to free trade and investroent. As to
foreign aid, they be1ieve it should be used either for security
purposes-- to help friands under attack, or to attack or deter
enemies-- or to promete the private sector.
Democrats tend te believe that gevernments have an important
r\'le in trying to selve collective problems. They accept tht;:l
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importance of free markets, but they also believe that government
should aim to correct the social problems-- economists call them
"externalities"-- that cannot be solved by just private
decisions.
Therefore, in terms of trade policy, while agreeing to the
importance of free trade, Democrats tend to be more sensitive to
its social costs. They tend to advocate more assistance and a
more active industrial pelicy te help declining sectors adjust to
the adverse effects cf trade. Te signal that tha Democratic
party is aware and sensitive to the plight of trade-impacted
industry and labor, which are generally in the Northeast or
Midwest, two Democratic strong-holds, Democrats are impelled to
be more activist in trade policy: they tend to threaten U.S.
trading partners more that they will raise barriers unless our
partners reduce their own barriers.
with regard to investment policy, Democrats agree with
Republicans on the importance of foreign investment abroad and
the need to reduce restrictions on such investment. However,
Democrats also believe that governments have important roles to
play in promoting development. Therefore, they don't give as
high a priority as do Republicans to persuading developing
countries to eliminate all restrictions on foreign investment and
to privatize. Finally, on foreign aid policy, Democrats tend to
place greater value on long-term development aid, less on
security assistance, and more on international development
institutions.
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As between Congress and the president, the differences
between tha Democratic and Republican Partias on foreign economic
policies not as dramatic as they appear in the debate.
Rather, each Party and Branch tend to stress one side of the
shared valua, and through an interactiva process, the policy
generally accomodates both sides, though not equally.
VI.2.4 Events
Besides shared values, interests, and the decision-making
process, the crucial fourth variable fer understanding U.s.
foreign economic policy i5 events or decisions. It is a mistake
to think that the debate on U.S. foreign economic policy is
influenced solely by words, or that it is somehow disconnected
fraro the world, or that the debate i8 fought between static
interests -- international corporations and small, vulnerable
businesses. To the contrary, the debate varies in response to
some changes in the world and the absence of othe+ changes.
For example, the current debate on U.S. trade policy is
partly a response to the unprecedented trade deficit by the
U.S., particularly with Japan. If that deficit were reduced,
perhaps by the realignment of currencies, the pressures for a
new policy would be diminished. The widening trade deficit
stiroulated the debate on trade, but that debate took its shape
as a result of the other three variables-- shared values,
interests, and the mechanics of policy-making. Therefore, some
propoaals in Congresa seek to strengthen the U.S. ability te
retaliate against nations using unfair trade practicas: seme.
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propase quotas or tariffs against Japan as an inducement for i t
to reduce its surplus and accept more imports; and others press
for a new round of trade negotiations.
VI.3 A strategy
Ne now have a reasonably clear roadmap for locating U.S.
foreign economíc polícy and for influencing ít. The next steps
are, first, to monitor the U.S. debate and dialogue with U.s.
decision-makers. Secondly, one needs to think about substantive
trade-offs and strategies that will permit Latin America to play
a constructive and effectíve role in deciding on the evolution of
the international economic system.
Before taking any steps, however, Latin America needs to
decide that u.S. foreign economic policy deserves its priority.
This ls currently not the case. If such a shift in priorities
were to occur, the united Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) would have an important role to
play. A strategy is presented below on what it could do.
V.3.1 Resident Fellows
To expand its capability and assist Latin America and the
Caribbean to understand the U. S., CEPAL should provide at least
two fellowships each year. One would be for a government
official from Latin America and the Caribbean to spend one year
in Washington studying the U.S. foreign economic policy process.
The government Fellow should be encouraged to spend nearly half
of his time interviewing and talking with people in Washington
and should organize a seminar program that would bring speakers
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to the CEPAL office. to talk about different aspects of D.S.
foreign economia policy.
The second Fellowship should be for Latin American and
Caribbean Ph.D. candidates who have completed all their caurse
work and some of their preliminary work on their dissertation.
Their dissertation should, of course, be on $ome aspect of
qontemporary U.s. foreign economic policy or policy-making, and
these Fellows should also be encouraged to leave the libra+y and
interview as diverse a group of people as possible.
V.3.2 Advisory Group
For the CEPAL off ice in Washington to remain at the cutting
edge of U.S. foreign economic policy, it i8 critically impQrtant
that the staff step back from their day-to-day activities every
s ix months for two days of a "retreat" vIi th an Advisory Group.
The Advisory Group should be composed of 12-20 scholars,
businessmen, international civil servants (including people froro
other regions, for exarople, Japan and Europe), a few Latin
American government officials, and former U.S. government
officials. About half should be fram the united States.
The meetings should be held outside of Washington, and each
one should offer a deliberately regional (say, the West Coast,
mid-west, or South) perspective with a few guests invited froro
these regions to speak about how U.S. foreign economia policy
looks from their perspectives.
The "retreats" should be careft,l1ly anc1 effectively staffed
by the CEPAL off ice. lssues and a tight agenda should be
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identifi ed beforehand, and important articles, data,. and other
information should be sent to the Advisory Group at least two
weeks in advance of the meeting. The basic purpose of the
meeting would be to discuss trends in the international economy,
the current issues and debates in U.S. foreign economic policies,
the current issues and debates in Latin America, fu ture issues to
monitor, and ideas for what more could be done to strengthen
inter-American economic cooperation.
V.3.3 Lobbyists
The question is raised about whether Latin American
governments should hire lobbyists to represent and pursue their
interests in the U.S. Por issues dealing with legal or admini-
strative matters, it is adviseable for Latin American exporters
or governments to hire American lawyers, provided that they work
with Latin American lawyers. On issues of Congresional policy,
lobbyists could provide useful informatíon on the key actors,
their constituencies, and flexibility; they could offar a more
detailed map of the polítical landscape.
But there is no reason that Latin American governments
should hire lobbyists to lobby on their behalf; there is no
better lobbyist than the Ambassador of a country. A lobbyist
might help to point the Ambassador in the right direction and
offer some insights on the correct approach, but it is the
Ambassador who should be communicating his government's concerns.
VI.3.4 Substantive Trade-Offs
If the organizational mechanism works effectively, within
82
months to one' year, Latin Amerioan governmel"lts acting either
individually ol" as El. group should begin to think more
systematically about how to influence the debates in the U.S. so
as to advance their economic interests.
The first stage in trying to influence the debate is to
communicate a government's concerns and interests and hope that
these will be taken into account. The second stage should be te
begin sketching substantive trade-offs-- what Latin American
governments might consider conceding in order to obtain U.S.
oooperation, and vice verse.
This second stage should be subject to the widest possible
consul tations-- involving Latin American government officials,
the Advisory Group, and Washington policy-making officials. The
key questions are the very substance of policy and interests:
what does Latin America want? and what can i't expect to receive?
Both questions can be answered in the abstract, but the answers
would be academice To be realistic, the trade-offs need to
invelve hard thinking and decisions.
For example, the united states will continue te presa the
newly-industrialized countries (NICls) to graduate to full
responsibilities in the international trading system. This
means that the NICls would have to lower their trading
while at the same time, renouncing tariff preferences. Latin
Ameriaa le strongly opposed to graduation, but it is coming.
The outcome has only been postponed because oi the debt crisis.
The question is whether Latin America could obtain something
83
in exchange. Latin America ought to argue that the V.S. is
forcing graduation at the same timethat the U.S. is widening and
deepening i ts voluntary export restraint agreements. Latin
America would bewell positioned to reguest a dismantling of
these VERA's for Latin America (a maximal position) or at least
changes in the VERA's that would permit Latin America a 6-10%
rate of growth.
A secondexample regards the issue of services. If the
nations of the world close their markets to the services of the
U.S., and refuses to negotiate, then one could hardly expect the
u.S. to permit complete access to its markets. In for
negotiations on services, Latin America might consider asking tho
U.S. to 1ift its barriers to caribbean sugar and other Latin
agricultural products.
wi th regard to aid poI icy, the international developm(:znt
might receive a more favorable reception in Congress if
Latin American governments tried to communicate to Congress about
the importance of the international development banks for their
countries' past and future development.
****
There is much that could be accomplished the moment Latin
America and the U.S. begin to communicate more effectively across
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